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NOTE
Are We All in This Together? Enforcing
Class Arbitration Waivers
Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2016)

Ariel Monroe Kiefer*

I. INTRODUCTION
Mandatory class arbitration waivers are increasingly common in employment agreements.1 It is estimated that forty-three percent of companies have
mandatory class arbitration waivers.2 Employees sign them because they either
do not believe they will ever have a major problem with their employer, they
believe arbitration is a cheaper and faster method of dispute resolution, or they
simply do not read or understand the clause.3 Employees should question class
action waivers because they take away employees’ access to the court system
and their right to collective action.4 If employees cannot go to the courts or act
collectively to enforce their rights, the country might stop making progress or
even lose the progress it is making in protecting workers from discrimination,
unjust termination, and unfair wages due to a lack of recourse against illegal
actions by employers.5 For example, unions are able to secure better wages
and working conditions for employees than employees are able to secure on

*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2018; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018. I would like to extend
a special thank you to Associate Dean Gely and the entire Missouri Law Review staff
for their support and guidance in writing this Note.
1. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE ARBITRATION
EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR
RIGHTS 3 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf. It is difficult
to determine the exact number of employers with mandatory class arbitration waivers
since companies do not have to report whether they have arbitration agreements to any
government agency. Id. at 15.
2. Lauren Weber, More Companies Block Employees from Filing Suits, WALL
STREET J. (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/more-companies-block-stafffrom-suing-1427824287. This percentage is based on a study of 350 companies conducted by Carlton Fields Jorden Burt LLP in 2014. Id. The percentage has risen dramatically from only sixteen percent in 2012. Id.
3. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1, at 3–4.
4. See id. at 4.
5. See generally id.
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their own. Additionally, employees are less likely to win in individual arbitration than they are in an individual lawsuit.6 If they do win in individual arbitration, they generally recover less than employees who file individual lawsuits.7 The average damage award in federal courts is $176,000, while the average award in arbitration is only $36,000.8 Because class action waivers have
a heavy impact on employee rights, courts must carefully analyze the legality
of the waivers.
Part II of this Note discusses the facts surrounding the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Cellular Sales of Missouri to uphold a class arbitration waiver. Part
III of this Note analyzes the approach other federal circuit courts have taken in
upholding and striking down class arbitration waivers. Part IV explains the
Eighth Circuit’s rational for upholding the class arbitration waiver. Finally,
Part V discusses why the Eighth Circuit should not have upheld the waiver.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
John Bauer worked for Cellular Sales, an authorized Verizon Cellphone
retailer.9 As a condition of employment, the company required employees to
sign an agreement mandating that “[a]ll claims, disputes, or controversies . . .
shall be decided by arbitration” and only in “an individual capacity and not as
a plaintiff or class member in any purported class, [or] collective action.”10
After Bauer’s employment ended, he filed a class action lawsuit against Cellular Sales.11 He alleged that Cellular Sales violated the Fair Labor Standards
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 3.
See infra Part V.
STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1, at 20 tbl.1.
Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 774 (8th Cir. 2016); see
also CELLULAR SALES, https://www.cellularsales.com/store/stores/kansas/pittsburg/pittsburg-100401/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
10. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 774. The pertinent paragraph of the employment agreement stated,
All claims, disputes, or controversies arising out of, or in relation to this document or Employee’s employment with Company shall be decided by arbitration
. . . . Employee hereby agrees to arbitrate any such claims, disputes, or controversies only in an individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in
any purported class, collective action, or representative proceeding . . . . The
decision of the arbitrator shall be final, binding, and enforceable in any court of
competent jurisdiction and the parties agree that there shall be no appeal from
the arbitrator’s decision . . . . Except for the exchange of documents that the
parties intend to use to support their claims and defend against the other parties’
claims, there shall be no interrogatories, depositions or other discovery in any
arbitration hereunder.

Id.
11. Id. Bauer filed suit five months later. Id. The federal court’s dismissal of the
class action was not appealed in this case; rather, it is one of the ways Bauer claims
Cellular Sales violated his right to engage in concerted activity. See id. at 775.
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Act (“FLSA”)12 in several ways, including failure to pay overtime and improper deductions from his wages.13 Cellular Sales moved to dismiss the action
pursuant to the employment agreement’s mandate that claims be settled
through individual arbitration.14 The district court held that the agreement was
enforceable and dismissed the case.15 While the class action suit was pending,
Bauer filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).16
In response to Bauer’s charge, the NLRB filed a complaint on Bauer’s
behalf claiming that Cellular Sales’ employment agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).17 The charge alleged that Cellular
Sales’ requirement that employees agree to individual arbitration violated the
employees’ right to engage in concerted activity.18 The NLRA gives employees the right to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of . . .
mutual aid or protection.”19 Additionally, the NLRA states that it is an “unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”20 Cellular
Sales argued that the NLRB’s D.R. Horton decision, which held that agreements prohibiting class arbitration were invalid, should not be followed in this
case because the holding was contrary to Supreme Court of the United States
precedent and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).21 Cellular Sales argued
12. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
13. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 774; Complaint at 2, Bauer v. Cellular Sales

of Knoxville, Inc., (W.D. Mo. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-cv-5111).
14. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 774.
15. Id. at 774–75. The parties arbitrated the case and settled. Id. at 775.
16. The NLRB is an independent federal agency that protects employees’ right to
engage in concerted activity covered by the NLRA. Who We Are, NAT’L LAB. REL.
BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). The administrative agency process is different from a court proceeding. The NLRB Process, NAT’L
LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process (last visited Sept. 11,
2017). It starts when a charge is filed with the Regional Director. Id. The Regional
Director issues a complaint and notice of hearing. Id. Next an administrative law judge
presides over a trial. Id. The losing party can file exceptions and a panel for the NLRB
can rule on the exceptions. See Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC & John Bauer, 362 N.L.R.B.
No. 27 at 1 (Mar. 16, 2015). The losing party can then file an appeal with the federal
circuit court. The NLRB Process, supra. After that, the losing party can petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. Id.
17. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 775.
18. Id.
19. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
20. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). The NLRB also
argued that since the agreement did not have an opt-out provision, the agreement would
lead employees to reasonably believe that they could not file charges with the NLRB.
Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC & John Bauer, No. 14-CA-094714, 2013 WL 4427452
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Aug. 19, 2013); see infra Part III.A.2.
21. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452; see also In re D.R. Horton, Inc.,
357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2288 (2012), rev’d in part, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d
344 (5th Cir. 2013); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). Cellular Sales
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that the Supreme Court’s precedent in American Express Company,22 showing
deference to arbitration agreements, should control.23 Last, Cellular Sales argued that the FAA mandated that the agreement be enforced.24
An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled in favor of the NLRB.25 The
ALJ found that the NLRB ruling in D.R. Horton was controlling in this case.26
The ALJ also found that filing a class action was a concerted activity within
the scope of Section 7 of the NLRA.27 Although only one employee filed the
initial suit, filing the lawsuit was concerted activity because “it [was] engaged
in with the object of initiating or inducing group action.”28 Therefore, mandating that employees waive their rights to class-wide action as a condition of
employment impaired employees’ Section 7 rights and violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA.29 Additionally, Cellular Sales violated Section 8(a)(1) when it
filed a motion to compel arbitration in response to Bauer’s class action lawsuit
because it restricted his right to engage in concerted activity.30 The ALJ ordered that Cellular Sales revise or rescind the agreement and give written notice
of the change to its employees.31 Cellular Sales filed a motion to reopen the
record with the NLRB, but the NLRB upheld the prior ruling.32
Cellular Sales appealed the NLRB’s ruling to the Eighth Circuit.33 Cellular Sales argued that the NLRB’s decision was wrong because it relied on

made this argument to the NLRB in August of 2013, which was before the Fifth Circuit
reversed the NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL
4427452. For information on the FAA, see infra Part III.
22. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) (upholding a class arbitration waiver in a consumer contract for a credit card).
23. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.; In re D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2277 (holding that an employer violated section 8(a)(1) by requiring employees to sign an agreement mandating individual
arbitration to resolve all disputes as a condition of employment).
27. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452. Section 7 states, “Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
28. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452.
29. Id.; see generally infra Part III.
30. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452.
31. Id.
32. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC & John Bauer, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 27 at 1 (Mar. 16,
2015).
33. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 774 (8th Cir. 2016).
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two prior Board decisions, D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil, that were subsequently reversed by the Fifth Circuit.34 The NLRB asked that the court reconsider its stance on class waivers in arbitration agreements.35 The Eighth Circuit
overturned the NLRB’s administrative decision by holding that requiring employees to resolve disputes exclusively through individual arbitration does not
violate the NLRA.36 This means that companies can require employees to relinquish their right to file individual lawsuits, class action lawsuits, and class
arbitrations.

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part discusses the history and purpose of the FAA, the NLRA, and
individual arbitration agreements. It then analyzes recent federal circuit decisions both upholding and striking down employment agreements with class arbitration waivers.
The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to judges’ negative treatment
of arbitration agreements.37 Its purpose was to ensure that arbitration agreements were enforced according to their terms and to ensure that courts did not
treat them with contempt.38 It states that arbitration agreements “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”39 The FAA places arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contractual agreements.40 Accordingly, the
FAA contains a saving clause allowing arbitration agreements to be invalidated
for the same reasons traditional contracts are invalidated, such as unconscionability and illegality.41
34. Id. at 775–76; see Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th
Cir. 2015) (holding that an employer committed no unfair labor practice by requiring
employees to sign arbitration agreements); see also D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737
F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that an employment agreement prohibiting a
class proceeding was enforceable because a class action procedure was not a substantive right under Section 7 and because the FAA requires that arbitration agreements be
enforced according to their terms).
35. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 776.
36. Id. The court also held that Cellular Sales’ motion to compel arbitration was
not a violation of the NLRA because the agreement to arbitrate disputes individually
was legal. Id. at 776–77. Additionally, the court held that employees would reasonably
construe the agreement as limiting their right to file complaints with the NLRB, that
the unfair labor practice charge was timely filed, and that Bauer was an employee
within the meaning of the NLRA. Id. at 777–79.
37. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 362 (5th Cir. 2013); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP,
834 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333, 339 (2011)), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
38. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 364–65 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
39. § 2.
40. Morris, 834 F.3d at 984.
41. Id.; § 2.
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The NLRA was enacted in 1935 with the purpose of decreasing the power
differential between employers and employees.42 The NLRA gives employees
the right to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual
aid or protection.”43 The NLRA strengthens an employee’s right to concerted
action in Section 8 by stating that it is an “unfair labor practice for an employer
. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”44
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that arbitration agreements with class action waivers are enforceable.45 The Court preempted state case law prohibiting class arbitration waivers
because “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type
of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by
the FAA.”46 The Court reasoned that class arbitration interferes with the fundamental benefits of arbitration because it requires procedural formality, makes
the process slower, increases the cost, and increases the risk to defendants because there are fewer grounds for appeals.47
However, courts have treated class arbitration waivers in employment
contracts differently. Several United States circuit courts have heard cases regarding the enforceability of collective action waivers in employment contracts, but the circuits are split in their holdings.48 Courts upholding the collective action waivers rely on the FAA and the Supreme Court’s favorable
treatment of mandatory arbitration clauses.49 Courts that do not uphold collective action waivers rely on Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA, the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA, and the “saving clause” in the FAA.50

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 362.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
Id. at 341.
Id. at 348–50. Arbitration awards may be appealed on the basis that “the award
was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means” or an arbitrator was corrupt or
biased. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(2) (2012). Additionally, an
award may be appealed if the arbitrator refused to hear relevant evidence, refused to
postpone a hearing for good cause, exceeded his or her power, did not exercise his or
her authority, did not render a final and definite decision, or otherwise misbehaved. Id.
at § 10(a)(3)–(4).
48. Compare D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013) with
Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1161 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S.
Ct. 809 (2017); see also Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 990 n.16 (9th
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
49. See D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 357.
50. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161; Morris, 834 F.3d at 982.
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A. Courts That Enforce Collective Arbitration Waivers
The Fifth Circuit enforced a class arbitration waiver determining that the
right to class arbitration was procedural, not substantive.51 This distinction is
important because while a substantive right cannot be waived by an arbitration
agreement, a procedural right can be.52 The court supported its proposition by
analogizing it to the class action mechanism under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is a procedural right.53 The Fifth Circuit also found that class
procedures listed in employment statutes, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the FLSA, were procedural rights.54
The court focused on the FAA rather than the NLRA.55 The FAA prevents arbitration clauses from being disfavored by the courts,56 and the NLRA
protects employees’ right to collective action.57 The court reasoned that the
NLRB’s interpretation that the NLRA required a class procedure to be available to employees was facially neutral but that interpretation effectively disfavored arbitration because class arbitration changed the fundamental advantages
of arbitration.58 In a class arbitration, class members must be given notice, an
opportunity to be heard, a right to opt out, and adequate representation.59 This
makes the proceeding more expensive and more formal than individual arbitration.60 The court reasoned that requiring class arbitration is “an actual impediment to arbitration and violates the FAA.”61 The Fifth Circuit did not apply the FAA saving clause the same way as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.62
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because class arbitration interfered with the
main purpose of the FAA, the FAA saving clause was not a basis for invalidating the class arbitration waiver.63 According to the court, since invalidating
the arbitration provision violated the FAA, there must be a “contrary congressional command” for the NLRA to override the FAA.64 The court did not find

51. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 357 (reversing the NLRB decision, which held that
the arbitration waiver was invalid).
52. Morris, 834 F.3d at 985.
53. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 357; FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
54. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 357.
55. See id. at 358–60.
56. See id. at 358.
57. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
58. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 359 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333, 348 (2011)).
59. Id. (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348).
60. See id.
61. Id. at 360.
62. See infra Part III.B.
63. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 359–60.
64. Id. at 360.
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a contrary congressional command in the text of the statute or legislative history, and there was no inherent conflict between the two statues.65 Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit upheld the class arbitration waiver.66

B. Courts That Refuse to Enforce Collective Action Waivers
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits refuse to enforce class arbitration waivers. They focus on the NLRA and the FAA’s saving clause. The Seventh and
Ninth Circuits hold that the right to concerted activity was clearly guaranteed
by the NLRA.67 They further hold that the FAA does not mandate that employees waive that right.68

1.

Agreements That Prohibit All Class Proceedings Violate the
NLRA

Courts that refuse to enforce collective action waivers focus on the rights
granted to employees by the NLRA and find that the waivers violate those
rights.69 The Seventh Circuit analyzed the scope of Sections 7 and 8 and held
that the arbitration provision infringed on the employees’ Section 7 rights.70
The court reasoned that even though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was
not in place when the NLRA was enacted, the right to concerted activity still
included class arbitration.71 The court found no reason to believe that Congress
only intended to include proceedings available at the time the NLRA was
passed.72 Additionally, the court cited other collective procedures that existed
when the NLRA was passed.73 The court found that “[a] collective, representative, or class legal proceeding is just such a ‘concerted activit[y]’” under Section 7 because the plain language of the section states that “[e]mployees shall
have the right to . . . engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . .

65. Id. at 360–61. The Second Circuit also found that a class arbitration waiver
had to be enforced pursuant to the FAA because the FLSA did not contain a contrary
congressional command. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 (2d
Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Three years later, the Second Circuit reluctantly upheld a class
arbitration waiver because it was bound by prior precedent set in Sutherland. Patterson
v. Raymours Furniture Co., 659 F. App’x. 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2016).
66. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 362.
67. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1159 (7th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 983 (9th
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
68. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157; see also Morris, 834 F.3d at 984.
69. See, e.g., Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161; see also Morris, 834 F.3d at 981–82.
70. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1154–55.
71. Id. at 1154.
72. Id.
73. Id. For example, permissive joinder and representative suits were allowed
long before the NLRA was passed. Id.
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mutual aid or protection.”74 The employment agreement at issue did not allow
employees to file class actions in legal or arbitral proceedings; therefore, the
court held that it violated Section 8 because it limited employees’ Section 7
rights.75 Additionally, Seventh Circuit precedent holds that it does not matter
whether the employee was coerced into signing the agreement or entered into
it freely because requiring individual arbitration is a per se violation of the
NLRA.76 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he very formation of
the contract was illegal” because it limited employees’ Section 7 rights.77
The Ninth Circuit focused on Congress’ intent in enacting the NLRA and
held that the employment agreement barring class arbitration violated the
NLRA.78 While all of the circuits recognize that “[t]he Board’s reasonable
interpretations of the NLRA command deference,”79 the Ninth Circuit is one
of the few courts that explicitly follows the steps of Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council.80 Chevron provides courts with a two-step analytical
framework to use to review administrative decisions.81 Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB instructs courts to use the Chevron two-step analysis to review the
NLRB decisions.82 The first step under Chevron is to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”83 The Ninth Circuit
looked to the statutory language and congressional intent.84 The court found
that Congress clearly intended concerted activity to include “[t]he pursuit of a
concerted work-related legal claim.”85 Further, the court found that the intention was consistent with the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA.86 The court
held that since pursuing collective actions was clearly included in concerted

74. Id. at 1155 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)).
75. Id. (citing NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942), and National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012)).
76. Id. (citing Stone, 125 F.2d at 756).
77. Id. at 1159.
78. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 981–84 (9th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
79. Id. at 981; see Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1153; Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB,
824 F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 2016).
80. See Morris, 834 F.3d at 981.
81. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984). The first step is to determine whether the statue addresses the precise issue. Id.
at 842. In step two, “[I]f the statute is . . . ambiguous . . . the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id.
at 843.
82. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992).
83. Morris, 834 F.3d at 981 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 982.
86. Id.
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activity, requiring individual arbitration interfered with that right, thereby violating Section 8 of the NLRA.87 Since the NLRB’s interpretation of Sections
7 and 8 was consistent with clear congressional intent, the court did not reach
the second step of the Chevron test, which asks “whether the agency’s answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”88

2.

The FAA Does Not Require the Arbitration Agreement to Be Enforced

Even courts that refuse to enforce collective action waivers recognize that
the NLRA is not the only relevant statute – the FAA must also be considered.
The Seventh Circuit reconciled these two statues.89 If two statutes are compatible, “it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”90 The Seventh Circuit did
not find a conflict between the NLRA and the FAA because the FAA saving
clause confirms that agreements are not enforceable at law or in equity.91 Here,
the court held that the agreement to arbitrate violated substantive rights granted
by the NLRA; therefore, the agreement was illegal and fell under the FAA’s
saving clause.92 Because the court found that the FAA saving clause applied,
the court would be overriding the NLRA if it enforced the arbitration agreement.93 The court reasoned that overriding the NLRA would improperly elevate the FAA over the NLRA.94
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits recognized that the FAA’s purpose
was to make contracts requiring arbitration as enforceable as other contracts,
not more enforceable.95 While the Seventh Circuit focused on the saving
clause, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the problem with the agreement was
the bar on class proceedings, not that arbitration was the exclusive forum.96 If
the agreement only allowed individual lawsuits, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
it would still violate the NLRA because it bars collective action.97 Like the
Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA recognizes the contract
defense of illegality because the “illegal provision [was] not targeting arbitration . . . [so] the FAA treats the contract like any other.”98
87. Id.
88. Id. at 982–83; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
89. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted,

137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
90. Id. (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S.
528, 533 (1995)).
91. Id. (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
92. Id.; accord Morris, 834 F.3d at 988.
93. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1159.
94. Id. at 1159–60.
95. Id. at 1156; see Morris, 834 F.3d at 984.
96. Morris, 834 F.3d at 986; see Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157–60.
97. See Morris, 834 F.3d at 985–86.
98. Id. at 985.
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The Seventh Circuit also found that the FAA did not override the NLRA
because the NLRA’s right to concerted action was a substantive right, not a
procedural right.99 Courts treat substantive rights differently from procedural
rights.100 A substantive right is the “essential, operative protections of a statute.”101 A procedural right is an “ancillary, remedial tool[] that help[s] secure
the substantive right.”102 An arbitration agreement cannot waive a statutory,
substantive right,103 and courts will invalidate an arbitration agreement that
purports to waive a substantive right.104 Courts have invalidated arbitration
agreements where the agreement did not allow for damages authorized by statutes such as treble damages in an antitrust case and exemplary and punitive
damages in a Title VII case.105 The Seventh Circuit found that the right to
concerted action was “at the heart of the restructuring of [the] employer/employee relationship[] that Congress meant to achieve in the statute.”106 The
court reasoned that all of the NLRA provisions exist to enforce Section 7.107
The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that “substantive rights cannot be waived in
arbitration agreements.”108 The agreement did not simply bar the substantive
right to collective action in arbitration. Rather, it barred collective action in
every forum; therefore, the Seventh Circuit decided that the agreement must be
invalidated.109 The court left open the possibility that the collective arbitration
waiver may have been enforceable if it was part of the collective bargaining
agreement.110 The federal circuit courts are split on the impact the NLRA and
the FAA have on the enforceability of class arbitration waivers.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Cellular Sales, the Eighth Circuit held that employment agreements
requiring individual arbitration are enforceable.111 The court recognized that

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160–61; accord Morris, 834 F.3d at 986.
See Morris, 834 F.3d at 985.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 985–86 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
104. Id.
105. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the
award of treble damages under federal antitrust statutes cannot be waived); Hadnot v.
Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the provision of an arbitration
agreement barring any award of punitive damages was unenforceable).
106. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1160 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
107. Id.
108. Morris, 834 F.3d at 985.
109. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161.
110. Id. at 1158.
111. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016).
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the Fifth Circuit allowed such agreements, which overruled the NLRB’s prior
decisions in D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil USA.112
Cellular Sales relied on Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.113 In Owen, the Eighth
Circuit held that class waivers in arbitration agreements were enforceable in
FLSA claims.114 The FLSA requires employees to give written consent to join
a class action.115 The court in Owen reasoned that if an employee had to opt in
to a class action, she could also agree not to participate in a class action.116 The
court did not believe that the FLSA provision was a congressional command
to override application of the FAA.117 According to the court, the FAA’s reenactment after the passing of the NLRA showed “that Congress intended its arbitration protections to remain intact even in light of the earlier passage of [the
NLRA].”118 Lastly, other federal circuit courts that found class arbitration
waivers enforceable in the FLSA context persuaded the Owen court.119 The
Cellular Sales court found that Owen’s holding was “fatal to [NLRB’s] argument ‘that a mandatory agreement requiring individual arbitration of work-related claims’ violates the NLRA.”120 The court did not grant the NLRB’s motion to reconsider Owen’s holding.121
The court did not discuss why it did not defer to the NLRB’s interpretation.122 The court stated that it would defer to the NLRB’s interpretation of the
NLRA if it was “rational and consistent with [the] law.”123 It also stated that it

112. Id. at 775–76; see Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th
Cir. 2015); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013). In D.R.
Horton, the Fifth Circuit found that Section 7 of the NLRA was not a substantive right.
D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 362. The Fifth Circuit found that the agreement did not fall
into the FAA’s saving clause, and there was no congressional command exempting the
NLRA from the FAA. Id. Therefore, the court held that the class arbitration waiver
had to be enforced. Id.
113. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 776.
114. Id. (citing Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053–55 (8th Cir. 2013)).
115. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1052; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(2012).
116. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1052–53.
117. Id. at 1053.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1054 (citing Vilches v. Travelers Cos., Inc., 413 F. App’x 487, 494 n.4
(3d Cir. 2011); Horenstein v. Mortg. Mkt., Inc., 9 F. App’x 618, 619 (9th Cir. 2001);
Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378 (11th Cir. 2005); Carter v.
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004); Adkins v. Labor
Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002); Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA,
Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784, 786 (E.D. Ark. 2012).
120. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 775.
123. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Am. Firestop Sols., Inc., 673 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir.
2012)).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/18

12

Kiefer: Are We All in This Together

2017]

ARE WE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER?

937

need not defer to the agency’s interpretation of other federal statutes because
they are too far removed from the NLRB’s expertise.124
The holdings in Owen and D.R. Horton supported class waivers, which
led the court to conclude that Cellular Sales’ agreement did not violate Section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA.125 Because the agreement did not violate the NLRA,
Cellular Sales’ motion to compel arbitration in the federal class action lawsuit
also did not violate Section 8(a)(1), as it was not enforcing an unlawful provision.126 The Eighth Circuit held that employers can require employees to resolve all disputes with the company through individual arbitration.127

V. COMMENT
The Eighth Circuit should not have upheld the waiver in Cellular Sales
for four reasons: (1) the NLRA grants a substantive right to class proceedings;
(2) the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA was reasonable and the Eighth Circuit should have deferred to it; (3) the FAA saving clause prevents the FAA
from conflicting with the NLRA; and (4) public policy does not favor enforcing
class arbitration waivers in employment agreements.

A.

The NLRA Grants a Substantive Right to Concerted Action

This Section explains why Section 7 should be viewed as a substantive
right. Its legislative purpose shows that it was meant to protect a substantive
right. Additionally, the plain language and context of Section 7 distinguishes
it from procedural rules and statutes.

1.

Unlike the FLSA, the Legislative Purpose for the NLRA Shows
That It Grants a Substantive Right to Concerted Action

Owen did not bind the Eighth Circuit because the NLRA grants a substantive right to bring class claims, while the FLSA grants a procedural right to
bring class claims.128 Substantive rights receive greater protection than procedural rights, and an arbitration agreement cannot waive a statutory substantive
right.129 The claim in Owen was based on the employer’s alleged violation of
the FLSA, not a violation of the NLRA.130 The FLSA gives employees “[t]he
right . . . to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of
124. See id. (citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144
(2002)).
125. Id. at 776.
126. Id. at 776–77.
127. Id. at 776.
128. See id.
129. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
130. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1051–52 (8th Cir. 2013).
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any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action.”131 The purpose
of the FLSA is to maintain a “minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers” so that commerce is not negatively impacted.132 In contrast, the purpose of the NLRA is to “restor[e] equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.”133 The NLRA
equalizes bargaining power by allowing employees to act collectively.134
The legislature had different reasons for enacting each statute, and if the
language of the statute is ambiguous, the legislative purpose affects statutory
interpretation.135 In this case, the legislative purpose strengthens the argument
that the NLRA grants a substantive right. The legislature believed that the “inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership” led to problems in commerce and that “protection by law of the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively safeguards commerce” from those problems.136 The legislature’s goal was to enhance commerce by allowing employees to band together for “mutual aid or protection.”137 Allowing employers to force employees to sign away the principle right in the statute is contrary to the NLRA’s
purpose of protecting employees.138 Conversely, while the FLSA allows collective action, its principle purpose is to benefit commerce by protecting employees’ wages and hours.139 Because the FLSA and the NLRA were enacted
for different reasons, interpreting the NLRA’s right to concerted action as a
substantive right, while interpreting the FLSA’s collective action provision as
a procedural right, is justified.

2.

The Language and Context of Section 7 Shows That It Is a Substantive Right

The plain language of Section 7 also supports the conclusion that it is a
substantive right. Section 7 states that “employees shall have the right . . . to
131. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
132. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012); see Lewis v.

Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809
(2017).
133. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
134. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
135. See United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Our objective in interpreting a federal statute is to give effect to the intent of Congress . . . .
[A]bsent clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language is regarded
as conclusive.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d 443, 447
(8th Cir. 1999))).
136. § 151.
137. Id.
138. See id.; Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
139. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012).
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engage in . . . concerted activities.”140 The legislature could have used the word
“may” if it only wanted to provide a method to bring claims rather than to grant
a substantive right.141 Section 7 also says that employees have the right to
“engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.”142 Concerted action is a substantive right
because all of the NLRA’s provisions support and protect that right.143 For
example, Section 8 makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to deny
employees the right to engage in concerted action.144 Section 7 does not simply
suggest a procedure for resolving disputes; it grants employees a substantive
right to concerted action.145
Section 7 differs from the procedural right to a class action proceeding in
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23 is a procedural tool,146
but Section 7 is not.147 Further, simply because Section 7 addresses an “associational [right] does not mean that it is not substantive.”148 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “the right of the people
peaceably to assemble,” but that does not mean it is exclusively a procedural
right.149
Lastly, the way in which employees assert their right to bring a class claim
pursuant to the NLRA supports the proposition that it is a substantive right.
The FLSA grants a procedural right because employees must give their written
consent to become part of a class action.150 The NLRA does not have an equivalent provision.151 Owen reasoned that an employee should be able to opt out
contractually of a class arbitration proceeding if the statute requires him to opt
140. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (emphasis added).
141. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Con-

gress, too, appears to be well aware of the difference between ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the
funding context . . . .”).
142. § 157 (2012) (emphasis added); Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161.
143. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160. Section 158 makes it an unfair labor practice to interfere with employees’ right to engage in concerted action, which is itself protected by
Section 157. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012); § 157. Section 159 sets out guidelines for choosing representatives in concerted actions. National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2012). Section 160 gives NLRB the authority
to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 158)
affecting commerce. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012).
144. § 158(a)(1); § 157.
145. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160–61; Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975,
980 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
146. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
147. § 157.
148. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161.
150. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052–53 (8th Cir. 2013); Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and
such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”).
151. § 157.
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in to be part of a class action.152 This reasoning cannot apply to the NLRA
because there is no requirement that employees give written consent to join a
class action.153 Both the congressional intent and the language of Section 7
support the conclusion that the NLRA should be interpreted as a substantive
right.

B.

Deference to the NLRB’s Interpretation

The Eighth Circuit did not uphold the NLRB’s finding that Section 7 of
the NLRA granted a substantive right to bring class action claims.154 Notably
absent from the court’s analysis is any discussion of why it did not defer to the
NLRB’s interpretation.155 Unlike in Cellular Sales, there was no prior administrative agency decision in Owen.156 Therefore, the Owen court had more freedom to interpret the law because courts should defer to the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA if it is “rational and consistent with [the] law.”157 The
NLRB’s interpretation is entitled to deference because the NLRB enforces the
NLRA and sees a wide variety of cases concerning the NLRA.158
It is rational to construe the NLRA as granting a substantive right to employees to engage in concerted actions, including class arbitration proceedings,
because it is clear that this was Congress’ intention.159 It is well established
that Section 7 protects employees’ right to pursue judicial or administrative
claims to improve their working conditions and engage in concerted activity.160
Therefore, Section 7 clearly includes the right to bring class claims.161 Even
the Eighth Circuit recognizes that “a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of
employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment is

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Owen, 702 F.3d at 1052–53.
Cf. § 157.
Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016).
See id. at 775.
Id.; see Owen, 702 F.3d at 1050–51.
Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 775; accord Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823
F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). But see D.R.
Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that the NLRB’s
decision did not comport with the FAA).
158. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992); see also NLRB v. City
Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) (“[O]n an issue that implicates its expertise in labor relations, a reasonable construction by [the NLRB] is entitled to considerable deference.”).
159. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
160. Id.; See also City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 835 (“There is no indication that
Congress intended to limit [Section 7] protection to situations in which an employee’s
activity and that of his fellow employees combine with one another in any particular
way.”).
161. Morris, 834 F.3d at 985–86.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/18

16

Kiefer: Are We All in This Together

2017]

ARE WE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER?

941

‘concerted activity’ under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.”162 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit erred in failing to defer to the NLRB’s reasonable interpretation of the NLRA.

C.

The FAA and Class Arbitration Waivers

As referenced above,163 the rule of interpreting statutes is, “[w]hen two
statutes are capable of co-existence . . . it is the duty of the courts, absent a
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”164 Here, the NLRA and the FAA are capable of co-existing.165 The
FAA mandates that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their
terms.166 However, the saving clause confirms that contracts requiring arbitration will not be enforced if they are invalid “upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity,” such as illegality.167 Since the NLRA grants a substantive right
to concerted activity, a contract purporting to waive an employee’s right to
concerted activity is illegal because it violates the NLRA.168 The illegal agreement falls into the FAA saving clause.169 Further, the agreement is illegal because it waives the employee’s right to concerted action, not because it mandates arbitration.170 The NLRA and the FAA do not conflict – they “work hand
in glove.”171

D.

Public Policy Reasons to Invalidate Class Arbitration Waivers
in Employment Agreements

The Eighth Circuit failed to consider the public policy arguments against
enforcing class arbitration waivers. It is unclear exactly how many companies
have mandatory arbitration agreements with class waivers because the agreements are private and companies are not required to report this information to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.172 Additionally, the government does not have
an obligation to conduct official surveys to collect this information.173 There-

162. Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011).
163. See supra Part V.A.
164. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vimar

Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533 (1995)), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
165. Id.
166. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
167. Id.; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.
168. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157; Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 988
(9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).
169. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.
170. Morris, 834 F.3d at 982.
171. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.
172. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1 at 15.
173. Id.
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fore, the most accurate estimates come from private surveys like those conducted by Carlton Fields Jorden Burt LLP, which estimated that forty-three
percent of companies have such waivers.174 Many large companies such as
Nordstrom, Sears, and Uber have class arbitration waivers.175 Companies are
moving toward forced class arbitration waivers because they create the employment contracts, do not allow negotiation, and require employees to sign
the contract without changing it as a condition of employment.176

1.

Individual Arbitration Makes Litigating Small Claims Too Expensive

Employees who are unable to bring class arbitration actions are generally
unlikely to pursue any type of action against their employer for small claims
because individual arbitration is expensive.177 For example, in Sutherland v.
Ernst & Young, an employee had a claim under the FLSA for violations of the
minimum wage and overtime provisions, which equated to $1867 in lost earnings.178 The employee estimated that it would cost $160,000 in attorney’s fees,
$25,000 in expert witness fees, and $6000 in other costs to arbitrate the claim
individually.179 The court upheld the waiver even though the employee would
likely spend approximately $200,000 to recover only $1867.180

2.

Fewer Remedies Are Available in Arbitration Than in Litigation

Some remedies are effectively unavailable in individual arbitration.181 It
is harder to get employers to end a discriminatory or illegal practice when
claims are brought in individual arbitration.182 Because few employees are
likely to be enterprising enough to bring claims, the company might find it
cheaper to pay those employees to drop their claims, rather than change the

174. Weber, supra note 2. 350 companies were included in the survey. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id.; see also Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 774 (8th

Cir. 2016).
177. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1, at 6.
178. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
179. Id. at 294–95.
180. Id. at 295.
181. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 90 (2004). This article discusses class arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts; however, the logic applies equally to class arbitration waivers in
employment contracts.
182. Id.
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way it does business.183 Additionally, arbitration is private, so there is no publicity to encourage the company to make a change.184

3.

Employees Are Less Likely to Prevail in Arbitration Than in Litigation

The third problem is that employees are less likely to win in arbitration
than they are at trial.185 Employees only win 21% of cases in arbitration,186
whereas employees win 36% of cases in federal court and 57% in state court.187
Some employers may fare better in arbitration because they are “repeat players.” Being a repeat player is advantageous because the employer knows how
to proceed efficiently in arbitration.188 Additionally, employers who participate in more arbitrations before the same arbitrator tend to win more often.189
The benefits of being a repeat player are shown in the employees’ success rates.
For example, an employee had a 17.9% chance of winning when it was the
employer’s first time before the arbitrator; however, after an employer had
been before the arbitrator in twenty-five cases, the employees’ chance of winning decreased to 4.5%.190 While it may be possible to combat the repeat
player bias by hiring a lawyer who has participated in employment arbitration,
this is unlikely to happen.191 In one study, 54.6% of employers hired law firms
that had handled multiple employment arbitration cases, while only 10.7% of
employees did the same.192 Some arbitration agreements state that the employer will choose the arbitrator. If this happens, the arbitrator may favor the
employer due to a desire for future work even though such favoritism is against
the ethical standards for arbitrators.193 The inherent bias in the arbitration system and high cost make it difficult for employees to bring individual arbitration
actions. This difficulty is exacerbated if employees cannot bring the claim with
the help of other employees as a class arbitration.

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 90–91.
STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1, at 20 tbl.1.
Id. This data is based on all employment arbitration cases administered by the
American Arbitration Association derived from employer procedures. Id.
187. Id. The federal court cases surveyed were employment discrimination cases,
and the state court cases included all employment disputes except civil rights cases. Id.
188. Id. at 22.
189. Id. at 23.
190. Id. This data is based on a study of 2802 employment arbitration cases from
2003 to 2014. Id.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 22. The study was conducted by Alexander Colvin and Kelly Pike. Id.
at 22 n.57.
193. Id. at 23.
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Future Legislation

The legislature is aware of these policy concerns and is progressing toward limiting class arbitration waivers in employment agreements. The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act (“AFA”) would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment agreements unless the agreement was part of
collective bargaining.194 One premise of the statute is that the FAA was only
intended to apply to commercial disputes.195 Another premise is that allowing
mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts is unfair because
the agreements are not truly voluntary for employees, and further, many “employees are not even aware that they have given up their rights.”196 The AFA
has been proposed to the federal legislature several times. The latest proposal
was in 2015, but it did not pass.197
More recently, the Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States
Act (“RSRISA”) of 2016 was introduced to Congress.198 This bill is similar to
the AFA in that it would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements when an
individual or small business wants to bring a claim in court based on a statute
or constitution.199 It would not invalidate arbitration agreements that are entered into after a dispute has arisen.200 The legislation is based on the belief
that the FAA “should not have been interpreted to[] supplant or nullify the legislatively created rights and remedies which Congress, exercising its power under [A]rticle I of the Constitution of the United States, has granted to the people
of the United States for resolving disputes in state and federal courts.”201 It is
unlikely that such a broad bill will pass, as similar bills were introduced as
early as 2005 and failed under both democratic and republican congresses;202
however, it will greatly benefit employees if it passes.

194.
195.
196.
197.

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. § 402(a)–(b)(2) (2015).
Id. at § 2(1), (2).
Id. at § 2(3).
See id. Similar versions of the AFA were also proposed in 2005, 2011, and
2013. George H. Friedman, The Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act: Still a Well-Intended but Potentially Dangerous Overreaction to a Legitimate Concern, ARBITRATION
RESOL. SERVS., INC., https://www.arbresolutions.com/the-proposed-arbitration-fairness-act-still-a-well-intended-but-potentially-dangerous-overreaction-to-a-legitimateconcern/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
198. Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2016, H.R. 4899,
114th Cong. (2016). The bill was introduced on April 12, 2016. Id.
199. Id. at § 3(2)(b).
200. Id.
201. Id. at § 2(a)(2).
202. Friedman, supra note 197. Examples of similar bills that have been proposed
in the past are the Arbitration Fairness Acts of 2011 and 2013. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Cellular Sales, the Eighth Circuit upheld a class arbitration waiver.
The federal circuits are split on this issue. Courts agree that the NLRA and
the FAA are the main statutes involved in the analysis; however, courts interpret the statutes differently. Class arbitration waivers should not be upheld
because the NLRA was enacted to give employees more bargaining power by
granting employees the substantive right to concerted action. The FAA mandates that arbitration agreements be treated the same as other agreements, and
the saving clause prevents the FAA from conflicting with the NLRA. Additionally, public policy considerations weigh against enforcing class arbitration
waivers because employees will likely have financial difficulty in bringing an
individual arbitration action, and employees are less likely to win in arbitration.
In Cellular Sales, the Eighth Circuit upheld a class arbitration waiver, which
widened the circuit split and made it difficult for employees to vindicate their
rights.
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